Why M23 Exists: The History, Grievances and Politics Behind Eastern DRC’s Conflict Premium

For many observers unfamiliar with the conflict in eastern DRC, the March 23 Movement (M23) appears to have emerged suddenly in late 2021. That narrative, frequently advanced by the Congolese government and echoed by sections of the international media, portrays M23—now aligned with the Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC)—as a recent insurgency backed by foreign states. Regional analysts, however, argue that such an explanation strips the conflict of its historical context. They contend that the roots of M23 extend far beyond its resurgence in 2021—and even beyond its initial emergence in 2012. They trace the movement's origins to decades of unresolved disputes over citizenship, ethnic violence, broken peace agreements, political exclusion, and the persistent failure of successive governments to address longstanding grievances in eastern DRC. To understand why M23 exists, they argue, it is necessary to look beyond today's battlefield and examine the historical tensions that continue to shape eastern DRC. The movement has consistently framed its struggle around three central issues: the citizenship and political status of Kinyarwanda-speaking Congolese, the return of Congolese refugees, and the protection of Congolese Tutsi communities from persecution. The citizenship question The roots of the dispute can be traced to the 1970s, when President Mobutu Sese Seko granted citizenship to many Kinyarwanda-speaking communities, including Congolese Tutsi. That legal recognition changed dramatically in 1981, when a new nationality law effectively revoked—or at least cast doubt on—the citizenship of many people who had previously been recognized as Congolese. The reversal transformed questions of nationality into deeply political issues. Debates over citizenship soon became intertwined with disputes over land ownership, political representation, and national identity. For many Congolese Tutsi, it marked the beginning of decades of legal uncertainty, discrimination, and exclusion within their own country. The legacy of the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi The 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda profoundly reshaped the security landscape of eastern DRC. Following the defeat of the genocidal regime, hundreds of thousands of refugees crossed into what was then Zaire. Among them were members of the former Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) and the Interahamwe militia responsible for carrying out the genocide. Numerous United Nations reports and investigations by human rights organizations have documented that many of these armed elements established themselves in eastern DRC, where they later reorganized into armed groups, including FDLR. Successive UN reports have also emphasised that governments in Kinshasa failed to dismantle these forces and, at various times, tolerated or cooperated with them. For many Congolese Tutsi communities, the continued presence of FDLR became one of the most significant security threats in eastern DRC. From alliance to rebellion Relations between Congolese Tutsi and the Congolese state deteriorated further after Laurent-Désiré Kabila assumed power in 1997. Rather than eliminating FDLR as a regional security threat, critics argue that Kabila marginalized ethnic Tutsi within government institutions while allowing hostile Hutu armed groups to regroup near the country's eastern border. It was against this backdrop that Gen Laurent Nkunda established the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP). This was after the Congolese government had failed in its constitutional responsibility to protect Congolese Tutsi from attacks by the genocidal militia and other armed groups. The CNDP presented itself primarily as a movement committed to defending the minority Congolese Tutsi population and restoring security in eastern DRC. The promise of March 23 On March 23, 2009, the CNDP signed a peace agreement with the Congolese government. Under the accord, CNDP combatants agreed to lay down their arms in exchange for integration into the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC), political participation, improved security guarantees, and the implementation of agreed reforms. Former CNDP members later argued that Kinshasa failed to honor key provisions of the agreement. They cited poor conditions within the national army, continued discrimination, political marginalization, and what they described as systematic violations of the peace accord. Those frustrations culminated in May 2012 with the creation of the March 23 Movement, commonly known as M23. The movement deliberately adopted the date of the peace agreement as its name, arguing that its return to armed struggle was a direct consequence of the government's failure to implement the March 23 accord. M23 quickly emerged as one of eastern DRC's most formidable armed groups before suffering military defeat in November 2013. Many of its fighters, along with thousands of Congolese Tutsi refugees, fled to neighbouring countries, and the movement became largely inactive for nearly a decade. Although many believed the rebellion had been permanently defeated, it would later re-emerge. The return of M23 M23 resumed military operations in late 2021. Kinshasa portrayed the resurgence primarily as the re-emergence of a foreign-backed insurgency supported by Rwanda. Kigali denies the allegation. The movement, however, has maintained that it returned because the commitments contained in the 2009 peace agreement remained unfulfilled. It also argues that Congolese Tutsi communities continued to face discrimination, insecurity, and attacks by government forces and allied armed groups such as FDLR and Mai-Mai militias, while longstanding disputes over citizenship, political representation, and equal rights remained unresolved despite years of negotiations. Beyond the battlefield Reducing M23 to a rebellion that emerged in 2021 oversimplifies one of Africa's most complex and enduring conflicts. Whether one accepts the Congolese government's account or the movement's own narrative, understanding today's crisis requires examining decades of disputes over citizenship, identity, the consequences of the Genocide against the Tutsi, the implementation of successive peace agreements, and the security concerns of communities living in eastern DRC. For years, Kinshasa and many international observers have largely framed M23 as a foreign-backed insurgency driven by regional rivalries and competition over DRC's vast mineral wealth. Supporters of the movement reject that interpretation, arguing that while regional geopolitics has undoubtedly shaped the conflict, the rebellion is rooted in unresolved domestic grievances. They contend that the central issues remain the legal status of Kinyarwanda-speaking Congolese, the protection of Congolese Tutsi communities, the return of refugees, and the government's failure to implement political agreements designed to address those longstanding concerns.