Ndayishimiye’s Anti-Rwanda Rhetoric Mirrors Tshisekedi’s Strategy Premium

Burundi’s ruling CNDD-FDD describes its ongoing nationwide tour as an exercise to assess development activities, but the political messaging accompanying it suggests another purpose: laying the groundwork for the 2027 presidential election while using Rwanda as an external threat around which to mobilize support. On August 18, CNDD-FDD Secretary General Révérien Ndikuriyo met party representatives in Mabayi Zone, Mugina Commune, Bujumbura Province. He described Rwanda as an “enemy state” and warned participants against cooperating or maintaining relations with Rwanda, saying those found doing so could face arrest or even death. Participants were informed that, beginning in September, more than 500 Imbonerakure—members of the ruling party’s youth league—would undergo training in Mugina before deployment along the Rwanda-Burundi border. The information fit into a broader deterioration in Rwanda-Burundi relations and a documented history of abuses associated with the Imbonerakure. More importantly, they raise questions about a tour supposedly focused on development. Rather than concentrating on jobs, public services, and economic challenges, the CNDD-FDD appears to be using border communities to reinforce anti-Rwanda sentiment and present itself as the defender of Burundi against an external enemy. It is a political strategy strikingly similar to one used by Democratic Republic of Congo President Félix Tshisekedi. The Tshisekedi playbook Ahead of the December 2023 presidential election, Tshisekedi increasingly made Rwanda a central theme of his political campaign. At a December 2023 rally in Bukavu, South Kivu, Tshisekedi declared that after his re-election, he could seek parliamentary authorization to declare war and send Congolese forces toward Kigali. The message shifted attention from difficult domestic questions: what had his government achieved on insecurity, corruption, unemployment, infrastructure, and weak institutions in a country that has endured political and security crises for decades? Ndayishimiye and the CNDD-FDD now appear to be borrowing from the same playbook. By emphasizing Rwanda as a threat, particularly near the border, the ruling party can appeal to nationalist sentiment while diverting attention from Burundi’s own economic and governance challenges. From Wazalendo to Imbonerakure The parallel extends beyond rhetoric. In DRC, Tshisekedi’s government supported the mobilization of Wazalendo—"patriots"—armed "groups fighting alongside the Congolese army against AFC/M23 rebels. UN investigators have documented government support, including weapons and financing, to Wazalendo and allied groups such as the Kinshasa-backed FDLR genocidal militia. But the “patriot” label has fueled serious abuses. UN experts have documented kidnappings, extortion, torture, rape, killings, and reprisals against civilians, especially Congolese Tutsi accused of collaborating with the "enemy." The Imbonerakure and Wazalendo are different organizations operating under different circumstances. Yet the political logic carries similarities: mobilize actors as patriotic defenders, place them in areas portrayed as threatened by Rwanda, and risk turning civilians suspected of being “collaborators,” infiltrators, or foreigners into targets. Human Rights Watch has previously documented killings, disappearances, torture, arbitrary arrests, and intimidation involving Imbonerakure members, particularly against perceived opponents of the ruling party. External “enemies” cannot replace governance Under Tshisekedi and Ndayishimiye, anti-Rwanda rhetoric has increasingly become part of domestic political discourse. That approach is particularly attractive when governments have limited achievements to present to voters on economic development, security, and governance. But externalizing domestic problems cannot resolve them. Blaming Rwanda will not create jobs, stabilize economies, provide electricity, strengthen institutions, or improve public services. Nor will mobilizing armed groups or party youth structures address the underlying causes of insecurity. DRC’s experience with Wazalendo demonstrates the danger of turning nationalism into armed mobilization: groups created or supported as defenders of the nation can themselves become perpetrators against civilians. Burundi should avoid the same path. If the CNDD-FDD’s tour is about development, it should focus on development. If it is an early campaign for 2027, voters should hear what the party intends to do about Burundi’s economy, employment, agriculture, electricity, and public services. Tshisekedi demonstrated how politically useful anti-Rwanda rhetoric can become during an election campaign but also how dangerous it is after one part of the population identifies itself as more nationalist than another. Congolese Tutsi are killed on broad daylight with total impunity. Unfortunately, Ndayishimiye appears to be taking a page from that playbook. External “enemies” are easier to campaign against than domestic problems are to solve—and anti-Rwanda rhetoric is no substitute for governing.